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ii. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under the 
provisions of 78-2a-3 (2) (d) and Rule 3 of the rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
The Defendant was arrested on October 14, 1988, north of 
Laketown, Rich County, Utah, for the offenses charged herein. Upon 
his arrest written citations were issued to the Justices Court of 
Rich County and copies delivered to the Defendant. Informations 
were thereafter filed by the County Attorney of Rich County in the 
Circuit Court. Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress which was 
denied by the Court and the matter was tried before a jury. 
Defendant was found guilty on all counts by the jury on the 11th 
day of April, 1989. The Defendant appeals from jury verdict, 
denial of his Motion to Suppress and denial of a Motion to Change 
Venue. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court erred in refusing to grant Defendants 
Motion to Change Venue. 
2. Whether or not the filing of an Information after 
citations had been filed constituted changing or amending of 
charges against Defendant. 
3. Whether the officer arrested the Defendant illegally, 
i.e., without a warrant for misdemeanor occurring outside of his 
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presence or as stated by the State whether the officer had probable 
cause to make an arrest of the Defendant. 
4. Whether the Court erred in failing to suppress evidence. 
5. Whether or not the Court erred denying a motion to arrest 
the jury verdict for doubt. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, RULES & CASES 
1. Change of Venue Issue. Section 77-35-29(e)(f) attached 
hereto as Appendix 1. 
2. With reference to the Amendment of charges, see Section 
77-7-18, Appendix 2; Section 77-7-21, Appendix 3. 
3. Relating to failure of the Trial Court to grant 
Defendant's motion to arrest judgment. See Section 77-35-23, Rule 
23 Arrest of Judgment. See Appendix 4. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. 
A. Nature of the Proceedings Below. 
The Defendant was arrested on October 14, 1988. Upon his 
arrest he was taken to the Rich County Sherifffs Office. At that 
time written citations were issued. Copies were delivered to the 
Defendant. Rich County Attorney made a Motion to Transfer to the 
Circuit Court which was granted by the Justice of the Peace. 
Informations were filed in the Circuit Court of Rich County. 
Defendant filed an "Appearance, Plea, and Waiver of Service", 
Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress and a Motion to Change Venue. 
Each was denied by the Court. The matter was tried before a jury. 
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Defendant thereafter made a motion to arrest judgment which was 
denied by the court. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
The Defendant Reid H. Ellis, a companion Mark T. LeFevre and 
two minors, Lee Ellis, brother of the Defendant and Shane Miller 
were first observed by Dee Hodges, who observed their vehicle pull 
in front of his service station in Laketown, Utah. (Tr. 37) He 
reported that one of the four went inside, then came back to the 
front door and reported to the others in the car that they did not 
have any Miller's brand of beer. (Tr. 37) His son Dennis Hodges 
reported that one of the boys attempted to buy a 4-pack of coolers 
(an alcoholic beverage), he had no identification and by reason 
thereof Hodges refused to sell him the alcoholic beverage. (Tr. 
40) Dennis Hodges identified the individual as Mark LeFevre. The 
four boys, in the same vehicle, then proceeded one block south to 
the Old Rock Store situated in Laketown, Utah, where Renee Earley 
observed the four of them come into the store. They were milling 
around the store including the back of the store where she kept 
cold beer. (Tr. 49) She identified the Defendant as one of the 
boys in the store on the first occasion. (Tr. 49) They bought a 
few things in the store and stayed approximately 5 minutes. (Tr. 
50) The vehicle with the four boys came back a second time, three 
of the four came in the store. (Tr 51) The proprietor of the 
store became suspicious. (Tr. 51) Mark LeFevre had a coat in his 
hand on the second visit to the store. (Tr. 53) Because the store 
owner was nervous she asked her son to stand in the aisle and watch 
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the three boys. The boys then departed the store. After her son 
left the store, the boys came back a third time. (Tr. 61) The two 
juveniles entered the store with Mark LeFevre. (Tr. 62) LeFevre 
had a coat in his hand and went to the back of the store where the 
beer cooler was located. (Tr. 62-63) The two juveniles went to 
the penny candy counter and requested that the proprietor count out 
110 watermelon slices. (Tr. 64) During the course of counting out 
the candy, the store owner observed Mark LeFevre departing the 
store with what she described as a "square coat" in his hand. She 
described the size of the square package beneath the coat as the 
size of a 12-pack of diapers. (Tr. 64) Because of the unusual 
appearance of the "square coat" she identified the car, the number 
on the license plate and bumper stickers of rock bands on the back 
of the car. (Tr. 67) The store proprietor went to the cooler and 
found a 12-pack of beer missing from the store. (Tr. 68) 
She called the Sheriff of Rich County on two separate 
occasions and reported what she had observed to the Sheriff. The 
Sheriff received the call from Renee Earley at approximately 11 
o'clock in the morning. He was given a description of the events 
which Renee Earley had observed. (Tr. 108 -110) . Acting upon the 
information that he had received from Renee Earley, the Sheriff 
went to the Southeast shore of Bear Lake where he identified a blue 
car in front of one of the summer residences that had bumper 
stickers across the back. The license number was the same as the 
one reported to him by Renee Earley. (Tr. Ill) The Sheriff got 
out of his car and went to the door of the summer residence where 
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he knocked on the door. A voice within the cabin indicated that 
the door did not work and to go around to the other side of cabin. 
(Tr. 113) The Sheriff went around to another door where he had a 
conversation with Reid Ellis outside of the summer residence. (Tr. 
113) The Sheriff identified himself as a police officer, showed 
Ellis his identification and indicated to Reid Ellis that there had 
been a commotion in a couple of the stores in town and that some 
beer had been taken from one of the stores. He then asked Reid 
Ellis if he could look around. (Tr. 114) The Sheriff testified 
that the Defendant said he didn't have any beer and the Sheriff was 
welcome to look around. Defendant admitted that he told the 
officer he could look around. (Tr. 311) The Sheriff then 
testified that the pair walked into the kitchen area of the summer 
residence where the Defendant opened cupboards and the 
refrigerator. (Tr. 115) The Defendant admitted that he opened the 
cupboards and refrigerator for the officer. (Tr. 312) The officer 
then testified that as he and the Defendant were in the kitchen, 
Mark LeFevre walked into the kitchen. (Tr. 115) The officer 
smelled alcohol on LeFevrefs breath and asked him to blow in his 
face (Tr. 116) and the officer smelled alcoholic beverage on his 
breath. (Tr. 116) Turning to Reid Ellis the officer asked him if 
he had been drinking whereupon Ellis said no and the officer 
repeated the request to blow in his face. The officer smelled 
alcohol on his breath. (Tr. 117) 
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Upon hearing noises in another part of the cabin, the officer 
asked if he could talk to the other boys. Defendant replied yes. 
(Tr. 118) Reid Ellis led the officer around to another section of 
the cabin which required an exit from the kitchen area, a walk 
around a path and an entrance into a bedroom area. As the officer 
stepped into the bedroom area he observed a can of beer on the 
floor. (Tr 119) The officer had asked prior to that time who was 
in charge of the cabin and the Defendant indicated that he was. 
(Tr. 118) The Defendant and the other three then indicated they 
were all under the age of 21. (Tr. 120) 
At the time of trial the officer articulated that, at that 
point, he had the following facts: he observed the same car as 
Renee Earley had described parked at the summer residence; two of 
the boys, both under age 21, Mark LeFevre and the Defendant Reid 
Ellis had alcohol on their breaths; the can of beer in the cabin 
was of the same type as reported stolen by the owner of the Old 
Rock Store; no one in the room was old enough to drink or possess 
beer and that there was being committed in the officer's presence, 
possession of alcohol and consumption of alcohol by minors. (32A-
12-13 UCA) (Tr. 120) 
The officer thereafter placed Reid Ellis under arrest and 
cuffed one hand. (Tr. 121) A struggle ensued. (Tr. 123) Mark 
LeFevre and Lee Ellis stood up from a seated position and 
positioned themselves behind the Sheriff. (Tr 123) The Sheriff 
then drew his hand gun to protect himself because he "didn't want 
to end up wrestling over the gun". (Tr. 123) The Sheriff, 
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realizing the situation, grabbed the loose hand cuff and attempted 
to drag Defendant towards the door, put the gun back under his 
belt, picked up the can of beer and got out of the doorway holding 
onto the hand cuff. (Tr. 124) The Defendant at that time was 
kicking at the officer, struggling and attempting to pull away. 
The other three boys grabbed the Officer's shirt, attempted to pull 
him back into the cabin and attempted to pry his fingers off of the 
can of beer the officer was preserving as evidence. (Tr. 125) The 
officer then released Reid Ellis, returned to his car where he 
radioed for help. Upon the arrival of other officers, the two 
juveniles surrendered to the officers where it was noted that Levi 
Miller, a juvenile had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath. 
(Tr. 130) During the next several minutes the officers made many 
attempts to get the voluntary cooperation of the Defendant and Mark 
LeFevre without success. The officers ultimately entered the cabin 
and arrested the Defendant. The Sheriff describes the Defendant 
as very combative, irrational and was not using good judgment. 
(Tr. 13 6) At the time of the arrest the officer again smelled 
alcohol on the breath of the Defendant. (Tr. 134) The Sheriff's 
recognition of alcohol on the breath of Defendant Ellis and his 
companion Mark LeFevre was verified by a State Park Officer Brian 
House. (Tr. 213) Officer Charlie Young of the Utah Highway Patrol 
testified that he observed the Defendant Ellis at the time of the 
arrest swing at the Sheriff or Officer Gregory with the hand that 
had a hand cuff attached to it. His statement at Tr. 218 is as 
follows: 
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"I don't remember if it was Dan or Gregory 
that grabbed his hand but one of them was 
loose and Reid Ellis took a swing at Officer 
Gregory the one with the hand cuff on it. It 
was loose and swinging and they were able to 
restrain him and get him out of the door and 
they cuffed him outside on the patio ". 
Relative to the issue of the consensual search, Lee Ellis the 
Defendant's brother, stated that he did not know if anyone said 
that the Sheriff could come inside the building and look around, 
but while the Sheriff was outside he heard Defendant say to the 
Sheriff go ahead and look around at which the Sheriff replied, 
"Let's go inside". (Tr. 269) 
The Defendant on the stand admitted telling the officer that 
he could look around. (Tr. 311) Admitted voluntarily opening 
cupboards and refrigerator for the officer while inside the 
building. (Tr. 312) 
When asked if the Sheriff of Rich County had showed him his 
badge, the Defendant replied, "Well, the Lone Ranger has one of 
those". (Tr. 318) Defendant also at trial (Tr. 319) testified as 
follows: 
Like I thought, he was one of those people who 
dresses up like a cop and then rapes people. 
I saw it on TV and I don't want to be a 
victim. (Tr. 319) 
The jury convicted the Defendant of all charges. Prior to 
sentencing Defendant made a motion to arrest the judgment which was 
denied by the Court and the Defendant was thereafter sentenced. 
Defendant appeals from the Judgment of Conviction. 
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II. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE 
AS THE SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT FAILED TO MEET THE CRITERIA ESTABLISHED 
IN STATE V. JAMES. See the affidavits at Appendix 5. 
POINT II: 
ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT CLAIMS THE COURT ALLOWED AN AMENDMENT 
OF THE CHARGES AGAINST THE DEFENDANT THERE WAS IN FACT NO SUCH 
AMENDMENT. FOLLOWING THE ISSUANCE OF A CITATION AND AN ENTRY OF 
A PLEA OF NOT GUILTY AN INFORMATION MUST BE FILED. THE DEFENDANT 
WAS, IN FACT, TRIED UPON THE INFORMATION WITHOUT AMENDMENT THAT WAS 
REQUIRED TO BE FILED UNDER THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF UTAH. See 
77-7-21. 
POINT III: 
ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT CLAIMS HE WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED WITHOUT 
A WARRANT FOR A MISDEMEANOR COMMITTED OUT OF THE OFFICER'S 
PRESENCE, THE FACTS AS ARTICULATED BY THE OFFICER SHOW THAT CONSENT 
TO ENTER THE DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE WAS VOLUNTARILY GIVEN. 
DEFENDANT HAD THE SMELL OF ALCOHOL ON HIS BREATH AND WAS IN 
POSSESSION OF ALCOHOL WHICH WERE MISDEMEANORS COMMITTED IN THE 
OFFICER'S PRESENCE FOR WHICH HE WAS ENTITLED TO ARREST THE 
DEFENDANT WITHOUT A WARRANT. 
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POINT IV: 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND AND THE EVIDENCE REFLECTS THAT THERE WAS 
CONSENT GIVEN BY THE DEFENDANT TO ENTER THE RESIDENCE. UPON ENTRY 
OF THE RESIDENCE THE OFFICER SAW IN PLAIN VIEW A CAN OF BEER WHICH 
WAS SEIZED BY THE SHERIFF. NONE OF THE OCCUPANTS WERE OVER THE AGE 
OF 21 AND THE BEER MATCHED THE DESCRIPTION OF THAT STOLEN FROM THE 
OLD ROCK STORE IN LAKETOWN APPROXIMATELY 2 HOURS PRIOR TO ITS 
SEIZURE. 
POINT V: 
THE JURY FOUND SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD FOR THE 
CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT ON ALL COUNTS, PARTICULARLY THAT OF 
THEFT WHERE DEFENDANT AS THE DRIVER OF THE VEHICLE FIRST WENT TO 
A SERVICE STATION WHERE AN OCCUPANT ATTEMPTED TO PURCHASE ALCOHOLIC 
BEVERAGES AND THEN DROVE TO THE OLD ROCK STORE WHERE ACHOLIC 
BEVERAGES WERE ULTIMATELY TAKEN BY ANOTHER. DEFENDANT HAD THE 
SMELL OF ALCOHOL ON HIS BREATH. HE EXHIBITED COMBATIVE AND 
IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR EVIDENCING CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL. 
ARGUMENT: 
POINT I: 
REID ELLIS CLAIMED THE COURT ERRED IN 
REFUSING TO GRANT A CHANGE OF VENUE 
Appendix 5 which is attached to this brief contains the 
affidavits submitted by the Defendant in support of his motion for 
change of venue. By far the leading case in the area is the 
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Supreme Court case of the State of Utah v. James, 767 P.2d 549 
(Utah 1989) . 
Using the James case as a yardstick it becomes immediately 
apparent that the Trial Court was "satisfied" in exercising its 
discretion not to grant the motion to change venue. The standard 
of review as set forth in the James case at page 15 is that the 
Appellate Court will not disturb the decision of the Trial Court 
unless there is an abuse of discretion shown. 
The affidavit of Reid H. Ellis, the Defendant, states his 
opinion that during the hearing witnesses in the courtroom were 
observed by him and he drew the conclusion that those witnesses 
considered him guilty without a hearing. He secondly concludes 
that the residents of the community are biased against "summer 
people" without further substantiation. 
The affidavit of Wayne Parry states that he is acquainted with 
Sheriff Cockayne and that he was subjected to harassment by the 
Sheriff and his deputies because he was a new comer in the 
community and he further alleges that the Sheriff and his deputies 
stopped his automobile, without probable cause, on 11 or 12 
separate instances and accused the affiant of various criminal 
offenses. 
Assuming every fact of the affidavit is true the affidavit 
concerns itself not with the prejudice of the community against 
outsiders but with the perceived prejudice of a sheriff against one 
outsider. 
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State v. James enumerates the elements necessary for a change 
of venue as follows: 
(a) STANDING OF THE ACCUSED IN THE COMMUNITY. There is no 
evidence shown by the affidavits that this Defendant would receive 
an unfair trial by the members of the community because he was a 
member of a group known as "summer people". Absent a showing by 
affidavit that the members of the community are prejudiced against 
summer people, the Defendant's assertion must fail. State v. 
Gellatli, infra. 
(b) THE SIZE OF THE COMMUNITY. Rich County is a small 
community with approximately 2200 residents. It has been stated 
that the smaller the community the more likely there will be a need 
for a change of venue. This rule has been applied to crimes of a 
heinous nature. This crime hardly fits that category. 
In the James case, concern was given because a substantial 
number of the members of this community made an organized effort 
to help locate a missing child. In this case there is an isolated 
incident of a theft from a store which was essentially un-noticed 
in Rich County. There is no showing from the affidavits of any 
news publicity whatsoever. Upon voir dire of the jury some of the 
jury members had indicated that they heard of the case but it was 
in regards to the Sheriff and not in regards to the Defendant. 
(Tr. 21) Therefore, the size of the community as it relates to the 
Defendant is of little or no significance and the issue is not 
addressed in the affidavits of the Defendant. 
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(c) THE NATURE AND GRAVITY OF THE OFFENSE. This offense 
started out as a misdemeanor offense of theft of a 12-pack of beer. 
It gravitated into assault on a police officer by the Defendant's 
refusal to submit to arrest and to have the matter resolved in an 
orderly fashion at the Rich County Sheriff's Office. Nonetheless 
the nature and gravity of the offense is not such that it should 
be grounds for a change of venue. 
(d) NATURE AND EXTENT OF PUBLICITY. There is no paper in 
Rich County. There was no publicity of this matter. Some members 
of the jury panel heard of this case but only through word of 
mouth. There was no evidence of a community feeling adverse to 
defendant. See State v. Gellatli. 449 P.2d 993 (Utah 1969) where 
the Court said that mere allegations that the whole community has 
knowledge of a crime by rumor particularly of a crime of the type 
herein involved is insufficient to indicate that prejudice or bias 
existed in the jurors who rendered the verdict. 
(e) Voir Dire of the jury as evidenced by the transcript 
indicates that the jurors who had any preconceived opinions or had 
formed an opinion about the case were dismissed. A question to the 
jury panel was asked as follows: 
"Have any of you at this time formed an 
opinion as to the officer's conduct in this 
case, whether it be bad, good, improper or 
proper? In other words have you formed an 
opinion?" Answer by an unidentified juror 
indicated, " I haven't formed an opinion but 
I am struggling with the question". 
The voir dire continued at page 21 of the transcript where the 
question was asked to the juror who was struggling with the 
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question. "Have you formed an opinion as to how this case should 
be decided from the information you have?11 Answer: "Ya, I feel 
influenced11. The juror was excused for cause. The pretrial bias 
shown by the jury was not adverse to the Defendant but appeared to 
be adverse to the Sheriff or his conduct in this case. 
The voir dire of the jury indicates undeniably that there was 
no adverse reaction to the Defendant by the jury but that some 
members of the jury panel had reservations concerning the conduct 
of the Sheriff. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Court's 
decision denying the motion to change venue reflects an abuse of 
discretion by the Trial Court. 
POINT II: 
DEFENDANT CLAIMS THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE AMENDMENT 
OF THE CHARGES TO DIFFERENT AND MORE SERIOUS CHARGES. 
Upon the arrest of the Defendant he was taken to the Rich 
County jail where citations were issued charging him with Class B 
Misdemeanor offenses. Upon review by the Rich County Attorney's 
Office, an information was filed in the Circuit Court alleging one 
Class A offense of assault on an officer and misdemeanor offenses. 
The Justice of the Peace transferred the matter to the Circuit 
Court. 
The officer is entitled to issue citations for misdemeanor 
offenses. Section 77-7-18 states (See Appendix 2) that an officer 
in lieu of taking a person into custody may issue and deliver 
a citation requiring a person subject to arrest or prosecution on 
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a misdemeanor or an infraction charge to appear at the Court of a 
magistrate before whom the person should be taken pursuant to law 
if the person had been arrested. A plea of "not guilty" was made 
by the Defendant requiring the filing of an Information. Section 
77-7-21 provides that if a person pleads not guilty to an offense 
charged, an information shall be filed and the proceedings held in 
accordance with the rules of criminal procedure. See Appendix 3. 
The Defendant on the 22nd day of November, 1988, entered a 
voluntary appearance in the Circuit Court, waived the service of 
summons and entered a plea of not guilty. (See Appendix 6) 
The Information was not an amendment but an original document 
filed as required by statute to which this Defendant filed a 
voluntary appearance. See Appendix 6. The Defendant's contention 
that the State amended the charges is simply not substantiated by 
the record. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT CLAIMS HE WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED, WITHOUT A WARRANT, 
FOR A MISDEMEANOR COMMITTED OUT OF THE OFFICER'S PRESENCE. 
The Defendant was arrested by the Sheriff of Rich County at 
the Harding Haven cabin about two hours after a shoplifting 
incident at the Old Rock Store in Laketown. The Sheriff, in his 
testimony at the time of trial, states that at the time he drove 
to the south end of the lake he had a reasonable suspicion that a 
crime had been committed. (Tr. 141) The officer testified he had 
prior experience with alcohol related situations. (Tr. 107) Utah 
Bar Journal, October, 1989, Col. 1 p. 12. That reasonable 
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suspicion developed into probable cause when he smelled alcohol on 
the breath of Reid Ellis who was not then 21. (Tr. 141) The 
Sheriff thought it unusual that the Defendant was so quick to deny 
evidence of beer in the house and his conduct in opening cupboards 
and fridge for the inspection by the Sheriff. As the Defendant and 
the Sheriff entered the second portion of the cabin a beer can was 
observed of the same type as stolen from the Old Rock Store and by 
reason of the fact that all of the occupants of the cabin were 
under the age of 21 the Sheriff arrested that person in charge for 
the offenses committed in the Sheriff's presence. 
The Defendant seems unwilling to concede the fact that there 
is credible evidence, believed by the Court and the jury, to the 
effect that the Sheriff of Rich County observed the commission of 
criminal offenses in his presence consisting of violations of 
Section 32A-12-13 UCA relating to minors in possession of alcohol 
and consumption of alcohol by persons under the age of 21. 
State v. Johnson, 104 Adv. Rep. 34 decided by this Court on 
March 21, 1989 describes the three constitutionally permissible 
levels of police stops. 
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any 
time and pose questions so long as the citizen 
is not detained against his will 
(2) An officer may seize a person if the 
officer has articulative suspicion that the 
person has committed or is about to commit a 
crime; however, the "detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary 
to effectuate the purpose of the stop"; 
(3) An officer may arrest a person if the 
officer has probable cause to believe that the 
offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
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The Johnson case concluded that the case involved the level 2 stop. 
The Officer, at the time he approached the cabin, had 
articulative suspicion having confirmed the description of the car 
and license number at the summer home. The officer then 
interviewed the Defendant, perceived the smell of alcohol on his 
breath, and found beer in the possession of the Defendant and 
others which was the same type as that recently stolen from the Old 
Rock Store. 
The totality of the officer's testimony indicates that the 
officer articulated to the Court and jury the transition from 
articulative suspicion to probable cause to believe an offense was 
being committed in the presence of the officer. 
77-7-2 UCA allows a police officer to make an arrest without 
a warrant if the offense is committed in his presence. 
The Defendant asks this court to believe that the only offense 
committed was that of theft and the Defendant was arrested for a 
theft not committed in the presence of the officer. The facts of 
the case do not support Defendant's contention. 
POINT IV 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE? 
Upon filing of the Information by the Rich County Attorney's 
Office, Defendant moved to suppress evidence. The Honorable Ted 
S. Perry, Judge of the circuit Court refused to grant the 
Defendant's Motion. At the suppression hearing the Court heard 
evidence from the Sheriff of Rich County to the effect that 
Defendant had consented to the search and had invited a search of 
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the area by opening cupboards and refrigerator doors for the 
Sheriff's inspection. (Hearing pg. 53) The Sheriff then detected 
the odor of alcohol on his breath and having determined that the 
Defendant had consumed alcohol recently, was under the age of 21, 
asked if he could talk to the other boys in the cabin. (Tr. 54) 
The Sheriff, upon entry into the second part of the cabin, observed 
the can of beer similar to that which was stolen. 
In State v. Joseph P. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah S.Ct. 1986) 
the court stated: 
Probable cause exists where "the facts and 
circumstances within their (the officers1) 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably 
trustworthy information (are) sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief that11 an offense has 
been or is being committed. 
The Court further indicated: 
The validity of the probable cause 
determination is made from the objective 
standpoint of a "prudent, reasonable, cautious 
police officer . . . guided by his experience 
and training." (Emphasis added) 
Reviewing the facts of this case using the standard set forth 
in the Dorsey case, supra, the Officer's entitlement to search was 
as a result of consent. The record reflects unequivocally that the 
officer did not place the Defendant under arrest until he 
determined that the Defendant had consumed alcohol and found 
alcohol in the building where he resided. 
The record reflects that there was consent given by the 
Defendant for the search of the property. Such consent purged the 
taint of any alleged unlawful search or seizure. In the case of 
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State of Utah v, Arroyo, 102 Ut. Adv. Rep. 34 decided February 15, 
1989, this Court held as follows: 
To determine whether or not consent is 
voluntary we look at the totality of the 
circumstances to see if consent was in fact 
voluntarily given and not the result of duress 
or coercion expressed or implied. 
This Court then concluded that although the original illegal 
stop was unconstitutional Arroyo subsequent voluntary consent 
purged the taint from the initial illegality and the motion to 
suppress should not have been granted. 
Additional theories might also be argued to assure the 
constitutionality of the seizure such as exigent circumstances to 
seize property which might otherwise be destroyed, search incident 
to arrest and plain view. However the fact remains that the Trial 
Court at the suppression hearing and at the trial, had before them 
evidence of consent to search given by the Defendant and further 
evidence that there was in plain view an alcoholic beverage of the 
same type as stolen from the Old Rock Store, in the possession of 
the Defendant and others, gave the officer ability to seize the 
beer without a search warrant. 
It's as interesting to note that at page 42 of a suppression 
transcript Mark LeFevre states that there was a can of beer that 
"Reid found in the wood box by the A frame" that someone had left 
there. However, at the time of the trial the Defendant testified 
as follows: 
Well, when I first - - when I - - when he 
showed - - when he goes what's this, you 
know, he said that, and I acted shocked. I 
didn't - - I hadn't seen it before, I didn't 
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know where it was, or where it had come from, 
and I thought maybe some other relatives had 
left it there. I don't know. 
The Sheriff is entitled to seize that which is in plain view. 
State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983). 
POINT V 
DID THE COURT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANTS 
MOTION TO ARREST THE JUDGMENT AND CONVICTION? 
See the case of State of Utah v. Larry W. Richards, decided 
by this Court on August 30, 1989 and found in 16 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
page 31. The facts of that case and the facts of this case are 
strikingly similar. 
A. In the Richards case evidence of the assault upon the 
officer was controverted by the defendant. Notwithstanding, the 
Court concluded that the officer has probable cause to arrest 
Richards for assault, regardless of the fact that the jury did not 
believe that there was sufficient evidence to find him guilty. 
The Court held that there was significant difference between 
the quantum of evidence required for conviction and that required 
to constitute probable cause for an arrest. 
The standard of review in this case is that the Court review 
the evidence of a jury verdict and all inferences that can be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. 
Tolman, 776 P. 2d 422 (Utah Ct. of Appeals 1989); State v. Richards, 
supra. 
B. The Defendant was charged with the offense of assault on 
a police officer on duty. Looking at the evidence most favorable 
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to the jury verdict, there is substantial evidence that Sheriff 
Cockayne identified himself to the Defendant verbally and by 
exhibiting a badge. Sheriff Cockayne described the assault. 
(Tr. 125) Officer Brian House describes an assault at page 218; 
Officer Gregory describes an assault at page 23 6. 
C. Retail Theft. The Defendant was a driver of an 
automobile that went first to a service station where an attempt 
to purchase beer was made. The Defendant then drove the three 
occupants to the Old Rock Store where the Defendant entered the 
store on the first occasion. On the second and third occasions 
Defendant remained with the automobile. LeFevre committed an act 
of theft and the proceeds from that theft where taken to the 
automobile which the Defendant was driving. When the Sheriff went 
to Defendant's summer home, the Defendant had the odor of alcohol 
on his breath. 
76-2-101 requires that the Defendant act intentionally with 
respect to each element of the offense. Section 76-2-103 defines 
intentionally as the conscious objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result of the fact. Although the Defendant 
did not enter the store on the third occasion that fact does not 
negate criminal responsibility by reason of the fact that he 
apparently had knowledge and was aware of the conduct of others and 
the existing circumstances. His participation is shown by the fact 
that he had alcohol on his breath following the theft. Sub-section 
2 of 76-2-103. 
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D. The jury found the Defendant guilty of unlawful possession 
of alcohol or possession by consumption. 
In the record there appears evidence of the availability of 
alcohol to the Defendant, that he was under the age of 21 years and 
that he had alcohol on his breath as testified to by at least three 
officers following his arrest. The officer described the Defendant 
as combative, not very rational and not using good judgment which 
certainly is indication of the consumption of alcohol. 
The jury being the finder of fact had before it sufficient 
facts upon which they could make a decision as to the guilt of the 
Defendant and it is incumbent upon this Court to review the 
evidence of a jury verdict and all inferences that can be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict. 
The Defendant would have this Court consider the actions taken 
against the other three individuals as a fact to determine whether 
or not the judgment should be set aside. 
Section 76-2-203 provides as follows: 
In any prosecution in which the actor's 
criminal responsibility is based on the 
conduct of another, it is no defense; (2); 
(2) That the person for whose conduct the 
actor is criminally responsible has been 
acquitted, has not been prosecuted or 
convicted, has been convicted of a different 
offense or a different type of class of 
offense or is immune from prosecution. 
There is credible evidence upon which the jury could base 
a finding of guilty to each of the three offenses charged. 
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SUMMARY 
Reviewing the Defendant's brief the Defendant would like the 
reader to believe that an innocent young man's rights have been 
violated (Brief 12) by a overbearing sheriff (Brief 14) who induced 
the County Attorney to throw the book at the Defendant. (Brief 15) 
The Defendant during the course of the trial sought not to deal 
with the issue of the guilt or innocence of the Defendant but 
sought to try the officer. (Tr. 157) The Defendant's own conduct 
in front of the jury as evidenced at page 306, 318 and 319 of the 
transcript evidences a lack of credibility the jury in all 
likelihood considered in reaching their verdict. 
The testimony of the officers shows there is ample evidence 
in the record upon which to sustain the conviction of the 
Defendant. For the foregoing reasons the State asks this Court to 
affirm the Trial Court's denial of the Motion to Suppress, affirm 
the Trial Court's denial of a Motion to Change Venue and affirm the 
jury's verdict and the Trial Court's judgment of conviction on 
three counts. 
DATED this SO day of Octobe]^1989. y^. 
RI^^ COUNTY /TTOPNEX 
. fan) £5% 
* George W.'-Preston 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF - RESPONDENT to Glen J. 
Ellis, Attorney for Defendant and Appellant at 60 East 100 South 
#102, P.O. Box 1097, Provo, Utah 84603 on thi^^O day of October, 
1989. 
rc\ellis.brief 
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APPENDIX 1 
77-35-29. Rule 29 — Disability and disqualification of a judge or 
change of venue, (a) If, by reason of death, sickness or other disability, 
the judge before whom a trial has begun is unable to continue with the 
trial, any other judge of that court or any judge being so assigned by the 
chief judge of the judicial council, upon certifying that he has familiarized 
himself with the record of the trial, may, unless otherwise disqualified, 
proceed with and finish the trial; but if the judge so assigned is satisfied 
that neither he nor another substitute judge can proceed with such trial, 
he may, in his discretion, grant a new trial. 
(b) If, by reason of death, sickness or other disability, the judge before 
w7hom a defendant has been tried is unable to perform the duties required 
of the court after a verdict of guilty, any other judge of that court or any 
judge being so assigned by the chief judge may perform those duties. 
(c) If the prosecution or a defendant in any criminal action or proceed-
ing shall file an affidavit that the judge before whom such action or pro-
ceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against such 
party or his attorney or in favor of any opposing party to the suit, such 
judge shall proceed no further therein until the challenge is disposed of. 
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that 
such bias or prejudice exists and shall be filed as soon as practicable after 
the case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is known. No such 
affidavit shall be filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of 
record that such affidavit and application are made in good faith. 
(d) If the challenged judge questions the sufficiency of the allegation 
of disqualification, he shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof 
be forthwith certified to another named judge of the same court or of a 
court of like jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the legal suffi-
ciency of the allegations. If the challenged judge does net question the 
legal sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is 
certified finds that it is legally sufficient, another judge shall be called to 
try the case or to conduct the proceeding. If the judge to whom the affidavit 
is certified does not find the affidavit to be legally sufficient, he shall enter 
a finding to that effect and the challenged judge shall proceed with the 
case or proceeding. 
(e) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal action believes that 
a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the 
action is pending, either may, by motion, supported by an affidavit setting 
forth farts, ask to have the trial of the case transferred to another jurisdic-
tion. 
If the court is satisfied that the representations made in the affidavit 
are true and justify transfer of the case, the court shall enter an order 
for the removal of the case to the court of another jurisdiction free from 
such objection and all records pertaining to the case shall be transferred 
forthwith to the court in such other county. If, based thereon, the court 
is not satisfied that the representations so made justify transfer of the 
case, the court shall either enter an order denying said transfer or order 
a formal hearing in court to resolve the matter and receive further evi-
dence with respect to such alleged prejudice. 
(f) Whenever a change of judge or place of trial is ordered all docu-
ments of record concerning the case shall be transferred without delay to 
the judge A'ho shall hear the case. 
APPENDIX 2 
77-7-18, Citation on misdemeanor or infraction charge. A peace offi-
cer, in lieu of taking a person into custody, or any public official of any 
county or municipality charged with the enforcement of the law, may issue 
and deliver a citation requiring any person subject to arrest or prosecution 
on a misdemeanor or infraction charge to appear at the court of the magis-
trate before wThom the person should be taken pursuant to law if the per-
son had been arrested. 
APPENDIX 3 
77-7-21. Proceeding on citation — Voluntary forfeiture of bail — 
Information, when required. (1) Whenever a citation is issued pursuant 
to the provisions of section 77-7-18, the copy of the citation filed with the 
magistrate may be used in lieu of an information to which the person cited 
may plead guilty or no contest and be sentenced or on which bail may be 
forfeited. With the magistrate's approval a person may voluntarily forfeit 
bail without appearance being required in any case of a class B misde-
meanor or less. Such voluntary forfeiture of bail shall be entered as a con-
viction and treated the same as if the accused pleaded guilty. 
(2) If the person cited willfully fails to appear before a magistrate pur-
suant to a citation issued under section 77-7-18, or pleads not guilty to the 
offense charged, or does not deposit bail on or before the date set for his 
appearance, an information shall be filed and proceedings held in accord-
ance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure and all other applicable provi-
sions of this code, which information shall be deemed an original pleading; 
provided, however, that the person cited may by written agreement waive 
the filing of the information and thereafter the prosecution may proceed 
on the citation notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary. 
APPENDIX 4 
77-35-23. Rule 23 — Arrest of judgment. At any time prior to the 
imposition of sentence, the court upon its own initiative may, or upon 
motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or admit-
ted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or 
there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon arresting judg-
ment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense charged 
is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until the defend-
ant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may be 
just and proper under the circumstances. 
APPENDIX 5 
GLLN J. ELLIS, #1514 94293 
~F.A:J B. ELLIS, #4976 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
'0 E^st^lOO South, Suite 102 
P.O. Box 109 7 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (SOI) 377-10 97 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR RICH COUNTY, SIAIE OF UTAH 
THE tJIATE uF UTAH, ) AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
Plaintiff, ) CHANGE OF VENUE 
VS. ) 
P.LID ELLIS, ). 
) CRIMINAL NO. S3-SK-9 
Defendant. ) 
S'.'ATE OF M. AH, ) 
) SS 
CO:::;J'Y OF ':TAH. ) 
The unJctiia.'ied in support of the Defendant, Rei<; 
Ellis' "o'- ; on for a change of venue on the 'grounds that he 
C'j!,:,ut receive a fair trial in rich County deposes as fol]o..v:: 
1. I'.y nc.i.:e is Wayne Parry. I reside at 750 South CI-
We-ct, Aparfr.ent 142, Pebble Creek Apartments in Provo, Utah. 
7. I art nineteen (19) years old at the- present t:'; •? . 
rror. the- tire that I -..-as fif-...en (15) u;.tii I v/os oi-jht •;. (" •;) 
years of age I resided in C-rJc-n City, Rich C: ::.ty, Vt-h. 
3. I art well acg j-J ; r;* ed with Sheriff r >S: :.,-..:• . i * i !. 
v.,.:.ly -::.-j \.'.~ d-p-:'r t~ .-nt --..J ar. i. <ri :;.-:•' ly w~ii f •: : ] i ^  r wiv :. 
the pi e j . •• • ....- whi':h * '• <"- i d .-.ilis feei:; -:. ~ ~-:: r •;*•••• "..r ; <: •; • •: 
.: j.-'Vt to ; r ^ ••'aiur. Ji rich Ce--:.ty. 
2 
4. When I lived in Rich County rr.y parents managed a 
Car.per World Camp Ground but I attended the Rich County High 
School. 
5. On seme eleven or twelve different occasions 
during the three years that I lived in Rich County I was 
subjected to har ra.^sment by the sheriff and his deputies for no 
other reason than that I was a new comer in the community. He 
made it a natter of departmental policy to blame me for 
practically everything that went wrong in the county during the 
three years that I lived there. He would pull me over if he raw 
me driving on the streetsf make me get out of my car and into 
the back seat of his patrol car and then would proceed to ca 1 I 
me nar.es, insult me, accuse me of various and sundry crires a;.a 
rake threats that he was going to throw me in jail, that he was 
going to do this, that or the other to me, and personally 
threatened me with force and violence. 
6. This occur c-d not only on isolated inci d.-nc- t but 
as I have raid on cloven or twelve separate and dis-i':ct 
instances/ the only variable being the things he would chaig- :.--. 
\.ith each time he pulled over. One tim- he claimed that I ha J 
(Uu :ced a bunch of buildings, I knew nothing of the incident, 
told him 1 would take a lie detector test ~nd told him that if 
he ..oulc tell me when and where the alleged offense occared T 
could account for my time. 
7. On several occasions he pulled me over and accused 
r- n
 0f drawing in drugs. Cn one occasion he accused re ui 
LrcakinJ and enterinq a here. 
6. He would never 
iid it to harra^s re and c: e t a k e C l e a t 
r C 1 f i C S :: e 1 
}uy in na r ra i . s i .vu 
1 
21 
3| 
4J 
5I 
61 
7 
81 
9 
101 
11 
121 
131 
M 
151 
161 
17 
181 
191 
20| 
21 
22 i 
23 
251 
261 
27 
26il 
9. On one occasion myself and a friend were going to 
a movie in another city, he kept us there in his car haranguing 
and harrassing both of us and accusing us falsely of having 
committed various offenses until we were too late to even go to 
the show. 
10. On another occasion he stopped us while we were in 
route to the junior prom at our high school, he intentionally 
held us up for in excess of two hours until we were late picking 
up our dates and the dance was practically over with when he 
finally let us go. 
11. He constantly harangued me about the length of my 
hair. I told him that my hair style was none of his bjsiness. 
12. The sad truth is, that of all the times he 
harrassed me and accused me, that Sheriff Cockayne never on any 
of the eleven or twelve occasions that I can drav/ to mine, ever 
did have any evidence of any wrong doing on my part nor 
a; :• -_rc-nt ly aid he have any evidence since I was never charged or. 
any of those occasions with any kind of an offense. In the 
was never chai -od 
no guilty or plead guilty to any offense of any kind by 
three (3) years that I lived in Rich County I 
f n •] r. n .: 11 i H v n r n1p."H c !! i 1 i v to 
the Sheriff's Department. They seared to just take great joy in 
l o o t i n g ire because I was a new cor.er in the community end was 
not old enough to stand up for myself. 
13. I am also personally aware that on another 
occasion a -jood friend of n[f, Tony Jackson, who is also a late 
corer in the community was accused by Sheriff Cockayne and h:s 
d-tuty of harboring a fugitive named Bishop. 
The sole basis for their ace; nations a c a i n s t 
.-.ere that he k;ie« the s h o o r The Sheriff broke into To; 
and the d^r'utv 
.- C L' -^ c 'J 
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ssvereljy physically attack Tony. They broke three ribs and 
left him in jail for three (3) days without medical attention 
and they held him incognito until Mr. Bishop was picked up in 
another state. 
14. On the question of bias against new comers in the 
community, Mr. Ellis is absolutely correct. I lived in Rich 
County for three (3) years and a person from outside the 
community is not given fair treatment and cannot expect to have 
a fair trial if it is known that they are not residents and long 
time residents of Rich County, he just will not have a chance* 
DATED at Provo, Utah, this /f* day of January, 1969. 
V7AYNE PARRY S . j ^ 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) ss 
C'y.'NIY OF UTAH. ) 
On the / / day of January, 1969, personally an:e^rod 
L-fure n.e WAYNE PARRY, who by rr.e being first duly rv.orn did 
•Tj.ose and say that he is the Defendant in the above entitled 
action: that he has read the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN S'JPPOPT OF 
DEFENDANT'S KOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE and knows and u\ der ? t a ;.dr 
the contents thereof and that the sar.e is true of his ov:n 
knov;!edce except as to ratters st-ated therein upon inf oi; ^  i L on 
and belief and as to such ratters he believes then to be tr':<*. 
1 
21 
3 
4 
5 
6 
i 
8 
91 
101 
11 
121 
13| 
14 
151 
1GI 
17 
181 
10 
201 
21 
22! 
23| 
24 
2r.ii 
20 i i 
Subsc r ibed and sworn t o be fo re me t h i s }®til') <3ay o 
J a n u a r y , 1989. 
:y Co~r, iss ion Exp. 
C2&S2)laAkhn }}Q _ 
'Y/aolqj 
KOIARXy PUBLIC 
Residing a t : £.)(• m/tiftJl 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I railed a true and correct cop 
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION tO 
CHANGE CF VENUE to 
George Preston 
?. ich Cour.ty Attorney 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
by cer-os: t i.ng the copies of the £f.n,e i,*to the United St.a;. •: 
;:ail, . v.-tage prop..id, this _/_2L_ ^°>' °' -i. Jor.ua i y, 1 y 89 . 
2S; 
GLEN J. ELLIS, #1514 
DEAN B. ELLIS, #4976 
Attorneys for Defendant 
60 East 100 South, Suite 102 
P.O. Box 1097 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 377-1097 
9386B 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR RICH COUNTY, RANDOLPH DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
VS. 
REID H. ELLIS, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE 
CRIMINAL NO. 88-SM-9 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
The defendant, being first duly sworn, on his oath, 
deposes as follows: 
1. I am the defendant named, and reside in Provo, Utah. 
2. I do not believe that I could have a fair trial on 
the charges against me in Rich County; during the suppression 
hearing, I became aware of the presence in the back of the 
courtroom of about ten persons, all residents of Rich County. 
From their conversations it was immediately plain that they 
considered me guilty, without a hearing, simply because my 
family are owners of a lake cabin, and we do not reside in Rich 
County. 
3. They refer to us as "summer people" and are highly 
biased against us, simply because we do not live in Rich County. 
4. I intend to have a jury trial, and do not feel, 
based on this experience, and many others of my family over the 
years, that I could have a fair trial in Rich County. 
2 
Dated this 21st of December, 1988. 
W&K 16 
Reid Harding Ellis 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) SS 
COUNTY OF UTAH. ) 
On the 21st day of December, 1988, personally appeared 
before me Reid Harding Ellis, , who by me being first duly sworn 
did depose and say that he is the Defendant in the above 
entitled action: that he has read the foregoing Affidavit in 
Support of Motion for Change of Venue, and knows and understands 
the contents thereof and that the same is true of his own 
knowledge except as to matters stated therein upon information 
and belief and as to such matters he believes them to be true. 
fe> 
Reid Harding Ellis 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of 
December, 1988. 
My Commission Expires: NOTARY £UBLIC 
4/&0/f/ Residing at: fi)£m?, {tilth? 
APPENDIX 6 
GLEN J. ELLIS, #1514 
DEAN B. ELLIS, 14976 
Attorneys for Defendants 
60 East 100 South, Suite 102 
P.O. Box 1097 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 377-1097 
9278B 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, RICH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, RANDOLPH DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
REID H. ELLIS 
De fendant, 
and 
VS. 
MARK T. LEFEVRE, 
Defendan ts 
APPEARANCE, PLEA AND 
WAIVER OF SERVICE 
Cr. No. 
Cr. No. 
Judge Perry 
Come now the Defendants by and thru Counsel, and make a 
voluntary appearance in the above cases, Waive the service of 
Summons, and enter a Plea of Not Guilty to all charges. 
Defendants have received a copy of un-numbered 
Informations, filed by the County Attorney herein on or about 
October 26, 1988, also they have received copies of Tickets 
numbered 2403 and 2404, which were issued returnable to the JP 
Court in Randolph, and on which they were arraigned October 14, 
1988 before Judge Ray Cox. In the JP court they waived the 
filing of formal Informations, plead "Not Guilty* to all 
charges, and were released on Bail. 
Inasmuch as the Sheriff of Pich County still refused to 
release Defendants, (though ordered released by the JP on their 
own Recognizance, ) on the Sheriff's insistence that he was 
going
 #to file additional charges in the Circuit Court (which 
2 
were not filed until October 26th or thereabout), Judge Perry 
was contacted, he approved Bail, and defendants are at this time 
free on $1,000 bail each. 
The Clerk has given Counsel a Trial Date of December 
13, 1988, at 1:30 PM. Waiving the informalities, defendants 
will, unless otherwise instructed by the Court, appear at that 
time for trial. 
At the same time the Defendants will also appear on 
their Motions , to Suppress and To Dismiss, and will request 
sanctions for failure to cooperate in Discovery. 
Dated this 22 nd of November, 1988. 
si ; / 
Glen J. Ellis-; Attorney for Defendants. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing APPEARANCE, WAIVER AND 
ENTRY OF PLEA to George Preston, Rich Co. Attorney, Box 402, 
Randolph, Utah 84064, and to 31 Federal Avenue, Logan, Utah 
84321, attorney for Plaintiff, postage prepaid, this 22nd day of 
November, 1988 by depositing the same in the United States Mail. 
1 
, Attorney 
